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COMMENTS
MINNESOTA MEETS THE DRUNK DRIVER HEAD-ON
[Nyflot v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 369 N.W.2d 512 (Minn.) (en
banc), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 586 (1985)].
INTRODUCTION
Taken from his car to the police station, the driver sits alone as the
officer sets up the chemical testing equipment. One officer ap-
proaches him and reads a statement regarding the chemical testing
procedure. He thinks the statement presents an option of submit-
ting or not submitting to the test. The officer, however, insists that
the test is required. The driver has always understood that if ever in
custody for a crime, he would have the right to call an attorney.'
The officer, however, insists that the driver no longer has this right
when deciding whether to submit to chemical testing. He is, there-
fore, held alone in custody until he decides between taking a test,
which could, in effect, prove his guilt,2 or refusing the test, which
would result in his losing his license for a year and having his refusal
used against him at his prosecution for driving while intoxicated.
Alone, confused, and unsure of what rights he has, the driver states
that he will not take the test until he talks to his attorney. Finding
this response to constitute a refusal, and the decision to be final, the
officer allows him to telephone his attorney.
The attorney now explains the effect of his serious and binding,
albeit somewhat unknowing decision. Such information, however, is
of little use to him now. The attorney can only assist him in facing
the consequences of his decision.' Such is the current system ofjus-
tice in Minnesota when dealing with a driver arrested for driving
while intoxicated.
Drunken drivers are a threat to everyone on the roads.4 In re-
sponse to this problem, state legislatures, including Minnesota's,
1. "What the public usually understands, and indeed expects, is that if one is in
trouble, the first thing to do is consult with a lawyer." Nyflot v. Commissioner of
Pub. Safety, 369 N.W.2d 512, 522 (Minn. 1985)(Yetka, J., dissenting).
2. See hifra note 172 and accompanying text.
3. The driver has irretrievably lost his right to submit to a test which could have
proven him innocent. "One can imagine a cynical prosecutor saying: 'Let them have
the most illustrious counsel, now. They can't escape the noose. There is nothing
that counsel can do for them at the trial.' " Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488
(1964).
4. Drunken drivers were involved in an estimated 21.000 fatal accidents in the
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have enacted implied consent statutes designed to curtail the threat
of drunken drivers on the roads.5 While answering one problem,
however, the implied consent statutes have created another. Implied
consent statutes have been interpreted not to allow individuals the
right to consult with an attorney before deciding whether to submit
to chemical testing of their blood-alcohol content. Because of this,
many concerned citizens are questioning the constitutionality of the
implied consent statutes. Citizens are attacking the statutes on the
ground that they have been interpreted in such a way as to deny indi-
viduals their constitutional right to counsel.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has recently confronted this prob-
lem. In Nyflot v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 6 the court interpreted
Minnesota's implied consent statute as effectively eliminating an in-
dividual's constitutional and statutory7 right to counsel in the im-
plied consent situation.8 Recently, in a summary action, the United
States Supreme Court in effect affirmed the holding in Nyflot by dis-
missing an appeal for want of a substantial federal question.9 In
United States in 1983. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, NAT'L DATA
BOOK AND GUIDE TO SOURCES - STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 600 (1985).
5. Simon, DII: 1982 & 1983 Legislative Changes .. , 41 BENCH & B. MINN. 35
(Mar. 1984); Note, Implied Consent Laws: Some Unsettled Constitutional Questions, 12
RUTGERS L.J. 99, 99 & n.2 (1980); Comment, Implied Consent Statutes and the Require-
ments of Due Process: Are They Compatible?, 26 Lov. L. REV. 180, 182 (1980) (all fifty
states have enacted implied consent statutes to get the drunken driver off the roads).
Examples of associations organized to eliminate drunk drivers include: Citizens for
Safe Drivers Against Drunk Drivers/Chronic Offenders, Mothers Against Drunk
Drivers (MADD), Truckers Against Drunk Drivers (TADD), React International: CB
Radio Coalition Against Drunk Driving, Students Against Drunken Driving (SADD).
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS 931, 932, 935 (19th ed. 1985).
6. 369 N.W.2d 512 (Minn.)(en banc), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 586-88
(1985)(White, J., dissenting).
7. Minnesota Statutes section 481.01 provides:
All officers or persons having in their custody a person restrained of his
liberty upon any charge or cause alleged, except in cases where imminent
danger of escape exists, shall admit any resident attorney retained by or in
behalf of the person restrained, or whom he may desire to consult, to a
private interview at the place of custody. Such custodians, upon request of
the person restrained, as soon as practicable, and before other proceedings
shall be had, shall notify any attorney residing in the county of the request
for a consultation with him. Every officer or person who shall violate any
provision of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, in addition to
the punishment prescribed therefor shall forfeit $100 to the person ag-
grieved, to be recovered in a civil action.
,Minn Stat. § 481.10 (1984).
8. Nyflot v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety. 369 N.W.2d 512, 515-17 (Minn.
1985) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 586 (1985).
9. 106 S. Ct. 586-88 (1985). Dismissal for want ofa substantial federal question
in a state court appeal is the same as an affirmance on the merits as far as the federal
questions under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(1) and (2) are concerned, and it is not restricted to
a determination of whether such a federal question exists. R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN.
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 378 (1978). Justice White, with whom justice Stevens
[Vol. 12
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their efforts to decrease the hazard of drunken drivers on the road,
the courts have created a new hazard by denying individuals their
constitutional and statutory right to consult with an attorney. In
Minnesota, an individual must make a binding decision which will
effect the outcome of his criminal prosecution for driving while in-
toxicated without the right to be informed by or have the aid of
counsel.
This Comment suggests that there is a constitutional and statutory
right to counsel in the implied consent situation. Part I will review
the history of the implied consent laws, and part II will analyze the
constitutional and statutory rights to counsel. Parts III and IV will
outline the development of Minnesota's implied consent statute and
focus on the Nyflot decision, respectively. Part V will discuss the con-
stitutional and statutory right to counsel as it applies to the implied
consent situation. The Comment will focus on the importance of
providing an individual with counsel in this situation. Part V will also
discuss possible alternatives to eliminating drunken drivers from our
roads in lieu of depriving them of the right to counsel, a right which
allows them to be clearly informed of the law by a liscensed
practitioner.
I. HISTORY OF THE IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTE
Every state in the country has made it a crime for a person to oper-
ate a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.lO The typi-
joined, dissented from the Supreme Court's dismissal. ,Nyflot, 106 S. Ct. at 586. Jus-
tice White stated that most courts that have considered the issue have rejected tile
argument that the sixth amendment right to counsel applies to the stage at which the
individual decides whether to submit to chemical testing. Id. at 588. He found, how-
ever, that a few courts have held that the sixth amendment right to counsel applies to
this stage of the proceeding. Id. He also stated that other courts have found a right
to counsel prior to chemical testing based on due process notions or state law. Id.
Because of these varied decisions, Justice White stated that he would note probablc
jurisdiction to resolve the issue presented. Id.
10. ALA. CODE § 32-5A-191 (Supp. 1985); ALASKA STAT. § 28,35,010(a)(1)
(1984); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-692(A) (Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-
2503(a) (Supp. 1985); CAL. VEI. ConE § 23152(a) (West 1985); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 42-4-1202 (1)(a) (1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-227a (a) (West Supp. 1985);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 41 7 7 (a) (1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-716(b) (Supp. 1985);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 316.193 (1)(a)-(b) (West Stipp. 1985): GA. CODE § 68A-902 (a)
(Supp. 1985); HAWAII REV. S'r. § 291-4 (a)(Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 18-8004 (1)
(Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, § 11-501 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985): IND.
CODE ANN. § 9-11-2-1 to- 2-5 (Burns Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.281 (West
1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1567 (Supp. 1985); K-'. REV. STAT. § 189.520 (Supp.
1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:98 A (West Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29.
§ 1312-B(1) (Supp. 1985-86); MD. 1RANSP. CODE ANN. § 21-902 (1984): MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 90, § 24 (l)(a)(1) (West Stipp. 1985): Micii. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 257.625
(West Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. § 169.121(l) (1984): Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-1 !-30
(Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 577.010-.012 (Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT. CoDE.
1986]
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cal statute provides that it is a misdemeanor for a person to drive,
operate, or be in control of a motor vehicle while under the influence
of alcohol, or when the person's alcohol concentration is over a cer-
tain percentage.' In order to determine the level of alcohol concen-
tration, the driver must undergo a chemical test of his blood, breath,
or urine. 12
It is often difficult, however, to get one voluntarily to submit to
such a test. For example, in Rochin v. California, 13 officers forced an
individual to vomit, in order to obtain two capsules he swallowed.1 4
The Court held that the officers' actions violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion.15 Although the individual in Rochin was not physically coerced
to submit to a chemical test for blood-alcohol concentration, the
ANN. § 61-8-401 (1) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.07 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 484.379 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 265:82 (Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 39:4-50 (West Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-102 (Supp. 1985); N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. LAW § 1192 (McKinney Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138.1 (1983); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (Page Supp.
1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 11-902 (West Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 487.540 (1983); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3731 (Purdon Supp. 1985); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 31-27-2 (Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2930 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D.
CODIFIED Lxws ANN. § 32-23-1 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-401 (Supp. 1985);
TEX. CIv. CODE ANN. § 67011-1 (Vernon Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44
(Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1201 (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 18.2-266
(Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.61.502 (Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE § 17C-
5-2 (Supp. 1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 346.63 (West Supp. 1985); Wvo. STAT. § 31-5-
233 (Supp. 1985).
1I. Most statutes provide that it is unlawful to drive or be in physical control of a
vehicle while there is .10% or more by weight of alcohol in the person's blood. See,
e.g., MINN. STAT. § 169.121, subd. I (Supp. 1985).
12. See MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subd. 2 (Stipp. 1985).
13. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
14. Id. at 166. In Rochi,. the police believed the defendant was selling narcotics.
Id. They entered his home and forced their way into Rochin's room. Id. When they
entered, Rochin placed two capsules in his mouth. Id. The officers tried to force the
pills out of Rochin's month, but were unsuccessful. 1d. They handcuffed him, took
him to a hospital where a doctor, against Rochin's will, put a tube down his throat,
and forced him to vomit. Id. The United States Supreme Court found the officers'
conduct shocking to the conscience. Id. at 172. The Court stated that the officers'
actions offended "those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of
justice of English-speaking peoples. See id. at 169 (citing Malinski v. New York,
324 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1945)).
15. See id. at 172; see also Breithatipt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). In Breithapl.
the petitioner was involved in an automobile accident in which there were latalities.
Id. at 433. The police found a near-emupty whiskey bottle in the glove compartment
and took the petitioner, who smelled of liquor, to the huspital. A physician, while the
petitioner was unconscious, withdrew a blood sample which showed the blood to
contain .17% alcohol. Id. The Court held that a blood test taken by a skilled techni-
cian was not the type of conduct which -shocks the conscience" as was lound in
Rochin. Id. at 437.
[Vol. 12
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chemical testing situation produces the same possibility of physical
coercion. In 1953, New York enacted the prototype implied consent
statute in response to Rochin. 16 Under that statute, one had the
power, but not the right, to refuse the chemical test. Rather than
overcoming resistance to the test with physical compulsion, the stat-
ute provided a nonphysical form of coercion, the adverse conse-
quences of license revocation.17 The desire of the legislature that
individuals submit to the chemical test without being physically co-
erced was the impetus behind implied consent statutes.18
To date, nearly all the states have enacted implied consent stat-
utes, but the wording and interpretation vary among jurisdictions.19
16. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 71-a (1953) (current version at N.Y. VEt. & TRAF.
LAW § 1194 (McKinney Supp. 1986)); see State v. Newton, 291 Or. 788, 794, 636 P.2d
393, 398-99 (1981).
17. See N.Y. VEIn. & TRAF. LAW § 71-a (1953) (current version at N.Y. VEH. &
TRAF. LAW § 1194 (McKinney Supp. 1986)); Newton, 291 Or. at 794, 636 P.2d 399.
18. See State v. Newton, 291 Or. 788, 794, 636 P.2d 393, 398-99 (1981). The
theory of implied consent originated in an automobie accident case. In Hess v. Pawl-
oski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), the plaintiff sued an out-of-state defendant regarding an
automobile accident in the forum state. Id. at 353. The United States Supreme Court
stated that because the state could regulate the use of its highways by non-resident
drivers, it could condition the use of its highways by holding that non-resident driv-
ers, had impliedly appointed an agent in the forum state on whom process could be
served. Id at 354. See Crump, The Admission of Chemical Test Refusals After State v. ,ev-
ille: Drunk Dtivers Cannot Take the Fifth, 59 N.D.L. REV. 349, 355 (1983). After Hess,
states realized they could place conditions on the use of their highways by drinking
drivers in the same manner they placed conditions on the out-of-state driver. Hess
274 U.S. at 355-56. State legislators found, therefore, they could condition the use
of their highways on a driver's implied consent to take a chemical test to determine
blood-alcohol concentration. Id.
19. ALA. CODE § 32-5-192 (1983); ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.031 (Supp. 1985); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-691 (Stipp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 75-1045 (Supp. 1985);
CAL. VEU. CODE § 13353 (West Supp. 1986); CoL.o. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1202 (3)(a)-(e)
(1984); CONN. GEN. STA-r. ANN. § 14-227b (West Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21,
§ 2740 (1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-502 (Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 3 16.1932(l)(a) (West Supp. 1985); GA. COnE § 68B-306 (1985); HAWAII REX'. STAT.
§ 286-151 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 18-8002 (Supp. 1985); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 95
1/2, § 11-501.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-1 1-4-1 (Burns Supp.
1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321B.4 (West 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1001 (Supp.
1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 186.565 (Supp. 1984); L.A. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:661 (West
Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1312 (Supp. 1985-86); Mn. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. § 16-205.1 (1984); MASs. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24 (1)(f) (West Supp. 1985):
Micu. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 257.625c (Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. § 169.123 (Supp.
1985); MIss. CODE ANN. § 63-11-5 (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 577.020 (Vernon
Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-8-402 (1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.08
(1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 484.383 (1985); N.H. REV. STAr. ANN. § 265:84 (Supp.
1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.2 (West Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-107
(Supp. 1985); N.Y. VEIl. & TRAF. LAW § 1194 (McKinney Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN
STATr. § 20-16.2 (1983 & Supp. 1985): N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (Supp. 1985):
OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.191 (Page Stipp. 1984); OKLA. S'rA-r. ANN. it. 47. § 751
(West Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 487.805 (1983); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
1986]
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In some jurisdictions, the statutes provide that refusal to submit to
chemical testing is a criminal offense.20 In these jurisdictions, there-
fore, the right to counsel under the fifth and sixth amendments must
be considered when an individual asks to speak with an attorney
prior to deciding whether to submit to chemical testing. Most juris-
dictions, however, distinguish between the civil nature of the implied
consent proceeding and the criminal nature of the driving while in-
toxicated (DWI) prosecution.21 Making this differentiation, courts
have held that the two proceedings are separate and distinct.22 Be-
cause the fifth and sixth amendments apply only to criminal prosecu-
tions,23 these courts have found them to be inapplicable to the
administrative implied consent proceeding.24
II. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Constitutional Right to Counsel
1. Fourteenth Amendment Right to Counsel
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment25 has long
been recognized as a source of a right to counsel when necessary for
a fair proceeding.26 Some courts have held that counsel is necessary
§ 1547 (Purdon Supp. 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 31-27-2.1 (Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 56-5-2950 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-23-10 (1984);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-10-406 (Supp. 1985); TEX. CIV. CODE ANN. § 67011-5 (Vernon
Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10 (Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23,
§ 1202 (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE § 18.2-268 (Supp. 1985); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 46.20.308 (Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE § 17C-5-4 (Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 343.305 (West Supp. 1985); Wvo. STAT. § 31-6-102 (Supp. 1985).
20. See ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032(f) (Supp. 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.08
(3) (1984).
21. Note, To Sulbinit or A'ot to Submit - lWhere is .M1y Attorney?: The Right to Counsel
Before Submission to Chemical Testi g in a D111 Proceeding, 63 NEB. L. REV. 373, 379
(1984).
22. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Sueppel, 258 Iowa 1173, 1180, 140 N.W.2d 866, 870
(1966)(the outcome of the criminal prosecution for driving while intoxicated has no
bearing on the civil license revocation proceeding).
23. The fifth amendment states that "nI(o person .. .shall be compelled in any,
criminal case .... ." U.S.CoNsT. amend. V (emphasis added). The sixth amendment
provides that "[i]n all criiiial prosecitios, the accused shall enjoy the right to .. .
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis
added).
24. See infra notes 53 & 91 and accompanying text.
25. The fourteenth amendtment of the United States Constitution provides: "'No
State shall . . . deprive any person of life. liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 1. The constitution of Minnesota provides, "No
person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law...
nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." MINN.
CONST. art. I, § 7.
26. See Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702, 716, 481 A.2d 192, 199 (1984); see. e.g'..
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970) (welfare recipient must be allowed to
[Vol. 12
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before submitting to chemical testing in order to assure a fair im-
plied consent proceeding.27
In Troy v. Curry,28 an Ohio court pointed out that although the im-
plied consent proceeding is not criminal in nature, the driver needed
the advice of an attorney to protect his rights.29 The Troy court
stated that it is unconstitutional under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to refuse a person accused of driving while
intoxicated the right to consult with an attorney prior to submitting
to chemical testing.30
The due process clause was also applied by a Michigan court in
Hall v. Secretary of State.3 ' In its analysis, the court weighed the indi-
vidual's interest in consulting with an attorney against the govern-
ment's interest in administering the chemical test.3 2 The court held
that to avoid problems which may arise during the administration of
retain an attorney for a pre-termination hearing regarding welfare benefits); Stovall
v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298 (1967) (counsel's presence will promote a fair confron-
tation and a full hearing at the trial regarding identification); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
41 (1967) (in juvenile court proceedings which may result in commitment to an insti-
tution the child and his parents must be informed that the child has a right to counsel
retained or appointed). The United States Supreme Court recognized the fourteenth
amendment right to counsel in 1932 in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The
Court in Powell held that it was the court's duty to appoint counsel in a capital case for
an individual who is unable to employ counsel and to make his own defense because
of ignorance or illiteracy. Id. at 71. To deny counsel in such a situation, the Court
reasoned, would be a due process violation within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment. Id.
27. See Heles v. South Dakota, 530 F. Supp. 646, 652 (D.S.D.), vacated as moot, 682
F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982); Hall v. Secretary of State, 60 Mich. App. 431, 440, 231
N.W.2d 396, 399 (1975); Troy v. Curry, 36 Ohio Misc. 144, 146, 303 N.E.2d 925, 927
(1973).
28. 36 Ohio Misc. 144, 303 N.E.2d 925. In Troy, the driver asked to speak with
his attorney before deciding whether to take the breathalyzer test. He called his at-
torney, and the attorney said he would be at the station within ten minutes. After the
call, the driver was again asked whether he would submit to the test. The driver
stated that he would like to wait for his attorney before deciding. The officer stated
that if the driver did not take the test right away, he would be deemed to have re-
fused. The driver chose to wait for his attorney. When the attorney arrived, the
officer refused to administer the breathalyzer test, and the driver's license was sus-
pended for refusing to take the test. Id. at 144-45, 303 N.E.2d at 926.
29. Id. at 146, 303 N.E.2d at 927.
30. Id.
31. 60 Mich. App. 431, 231 N.W.2d 396 (1975). Hall was arrested for driving
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. His request for an attorney prior to
deciding whether to take the breathalyzer test was denied. The court held that
licenses were not to be taken away without procedural due process required by the
fourteenth amendment. This required that the individual be allowed to call his attor-
ney before deciding whether to take the breathalyzer test. Id. at 440, 231 N.W.2d at
399.
32. Id. at 440, 231 N.W.2d at 399. The due process standard requires that the
court weigh the individual's interests against the state's interests. Note, Kirby, Big-
1986]
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the test,3:3 the government's interest is best served by allowing the
individual to consult with an attorney prior to deciding whether to
submit to chemical testing.34 This approach satisfies the due process
requirement of fundamental fairness. 35
In Heles v. South Dakota, 36 a federal district court applying South
Dakota law concluded that a license may be necessary to "the pur-
suit of a livelihood,"37 and therefore, it is an entitlement that cannot
gers, and Ash: Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the
Innocent?, 72 MicH. L. REV. 717, 744 (1974).
33. The court pointed out that the police may want to give Miranda warnings to a
driver spotted for driving while intoxicated in order to protect the admissibility of
inculpatory statements in the driver's DWI prosecution. Hall, 60 Mich. App. at 438-
39, 231 N.W.2d at 398. However, the Miranda warnings, which include advice on the
right to counsel, may confuse the driver if he is then told that he had no right to
counsel prior to the chemical test. Id. at 439, 231 N.W.2d at 399. See infra note 74
and accompanying text.
The court in Hall also found that because the legislation provided that an arres-
tee could reasonably refuse to take the test, counsel may be necessary in order for an
individual to determine fairly whether his refusal is reasonable. See Hall, 60 Mich.
App. at 440, 231 N.W.2d at 399.
34. Hall, 60 Mich. App. at 440, 231 N.W.2d at 399.
35. See id. at 438-440, 231 N.W.2d at 398-99.
36. 530 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D.), vacated as moot, 682 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982).
Although Heles was vacated as moot because the driver later died, it provides a useful
example of the due process approach to the right to counsel in the chemical testing
situation. Heles requested to consult an attorney several times prior to deciding
whether to take the breathalyzer test. Each request was denied. One hour after his
arrest, he was permitted to call his attorney, who recommended he take the test.
Heles and his attorney asked that Heles now be allowed to take the test. The officer
refused. Heles, 530 F. Supp. at 649. The court held that due process demands that
Heles have a reasonable opportunity to contact his attorney prior to his decision
regarding the test. Id. at 654. Braunsereither, who joined Heles in this action, was
given the opportunity to call his attorney. After one hour, he was still unable to
reach his attorney and the officer requested that he make his decision on his own.
The court held that Braunsereither was given a reasonable opportunity to contact his
attorney and he could not expect the officer to delay the test indefinitely while he
tried to contact his attorney. Id.
37. Id. at 652. In its analysis of the importance of a driver's license, the court
cited Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). This case did not involve a DWI related
offense, but rather the driver's license was revoked for violating a statute which held
that an uninsured motorist involved in an accident must post security for damages
without consideration of his fault or responsibility for the accident at a pre-suspen-
sion hearing. Id. at 537-38. The Court held that this violated the driver's procedural
due process and that before the state may revoke the driver's license it must provide
a forum for the determination of the likelihood of a judgment against him for the
accident. Id. at 542. The Heles Court also cited Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977).
In Dixon, a driver's license was revoked without a preliminary hearing for his re-
peated traffic violations. The Court distinguished this case from Bell because public
safety, as opposed to security for judgments, was inolved in Dixon. Id. at 114-15. The
Court held that the public interests involved were sufficient for the state to make its
initial decision valid, based on the individual's driving record, without a preliminary
hearing. Id. at 115.
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be taken without procedural due process.38 Due process embodies
society's idea of reasonableness and fundamental fairness.:') The
Heles court found that to force a person to make a decision which
could result in license revocation, without the aid of counsel, would
be fundamentally unfair and thus would constitute a due process
violation.4O
Troy, Hall, and Heles were based on civil license revocation pro-
ceedings. The reasoning, however, used by courts for applying a
fourteenth amendment right to counsel in DWI prosecutions also
seems applicable to implied consent proceedings. In State v.
Newton,4 1 the Oregon Supreme Court stated that the freedom of an
arrested person to communicate beyond confinement is a substantial
liberty which may be restricted only if there is a legal right to do so.42
The court found that allowing an individual a reasonable amount of
time to call an attorney would not affect the evidence gathering pro-
cess in the chemical testing situation.43 The court held, therefore,
that police had no legal right to restrict an individual's opportunity
to contact an attorney prior to deciding whether to submit to chemi-
cal testing.44
In Sites v. State,45 which also involved a DWI prosecution, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland stated that a driver's license is an enti-
tlement which cannot be taken from a person without due process.
38. Heles, 530 F. Supp. at 652.
39. Murphy, Constitutional Bases for a Right of Access to Counsel at the Pre-trial Stages of
Drunk Driving Prosecutions: A Study in Conflicting Rights, 4 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 203, 219-20
(1984).
40. Heles, 530 F. Supp. at 652-53.
41. 291 Or. 788, 636 P.2d 393 (1981). In Newton, the defendant was arrested for
driving while under the influence of alcohol. He was advised of his right to counsel
and to remain silent. The defendant requested to speak with his attorney prior to
taking the test. The officer refused, stating that regardless of information he may
have received before the request, he did not have the right to an attorney at the
breathalyzer test and his request for a delay to consult with an attorney will constitute
a refusal. The defendant took the test, which indicated a blood-alcohol content of
.10%. The court held that there was an unauthorized restriction of the defendant's
freedom to call his attorney. Id. at 808, 636 P.2d at 407. Such a freedom is a sub-
stantial liberty which may only be officially restriced if legal authority allows it. Id. at
807, 636 P.2d at 406.
42. Aewton, 291 Or. at 807, 636 P.2d at 406.
43. Id. at 808, 636 P.2d at 406. The court pointed out that under Oregon law an
individual in custody for driving while intoxicated must be observed for fifteen min-
utes before the chemical test is administered, Id. at 808, 636 P.2d at 406. During this
observation period, an individual would have time to call an attorney. Id. In addi-
tion, most states provide that the test must be given within two hours of the time of
driving. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 169.121, subd 1(e) (1984). Within this two-hour
span, the court found that one could be provided with a reasonable amount of time
to contact an attorney. See NVewton. 291 Or. at 808, 636 P.2d at 406.
44. See Newton, 291 Or. at 808-09, 636 P.2d at 407.
45. 300 Md. 702, 481 A.2d 192 (1984).
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The court found that due process requires that a person arrested for
driving while intoxicated be permitted a reasonable opportunity to
communicate with counsel prior to submitting to a chemical test.4 6
The Sites court held that this process, however, must not substantially
interfere with the administration of the test.
4 7
As the above-cited cases demonstrate, the fourteenth amendment
right to counsel is broad. It is not limited to criminal proceedings,
but rather, extends to all proceedings where it is necessary for funda-
mental fairness. Because of the importance of one's right to drive
and one's right to communicate, some courts have found the right to
counsel prior to testing is necessary to ensure a fair implied consent
proceeding.
2. Fifth Amendment Right to Counsel
In addition to the fourteenth amendment right to counsel, the fifth
amendment also requires a right to counsel based on self-incrimina-
tion grounds. The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against him-
self."48 The United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona
49
held that prior to custodial interrogation,50 a suspect must be
warned of his right to counsel in order to protect his right against
self-incrimination.51 The right against self-incrimination, however,
is limited to criminal proceedings.5 2
It could be argued that because the proceeding under the implied
consent statute is civil in nature, the fifth amendment right to coun-
sel is inapplicable.53 Some courts, however, have stated that the
46. Id. at 717-18, 481 A.2d at 200.
47. Id.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7.
49. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
50. In Miranda, custodial interrogation was defined as "questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
51. Id. at 471. The Miranda Court held that the prosecution may not use state-
ments from a custodial interrogation unless it shows that it used procedural safe-
guards which were effective to secure the right against self-incrimination. Id. at 444.
The procedural safeguards include informing the accused of his right to remain si-
lent, and that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has the right to have an attorney present. The attorney may be either re-
tained or appointed. Id.
52. Id. at 477.
53. The Minnesota Court of Appeals, in Butler v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 348
N.W.2d 827 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), stated that because the implied consent proceed-
ing is civil in nature, rather than criminal, the fifth amendment right to .Miranda warn-
ings does not attach. Id. at 828. It could be argued, therefore, that the fifth
amendment right to counsel as provided through the Miranda warnings is also inap-
plicable to the civil implied consent proceeding. See also Note, supra note 21, at 379
(courts have found the proceedings to be civil in nature, and therefore, no fifth or
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driver's license revocation for refusing to submit to chemical testing
is so entwined with the prosecution for driving while intoxicated that
such a distinction cannot be made.54 The nexus between the implied
consent proceeding and the criminal prosecution for driving while
intoxicated is the result of two factors. First, the results from the
chemical test are used against the driver at his prosecution for driv-
ing while intoxicated.55 Second, many statutes provide that the
driver's refusal to submit to chemical testing under the implied con-
sent statute is admissible in evidence in the prosecution against the
driver for driving while intoxicated.56
Courts, however, have not based their decisions on the civil nature
of the implied consent proceeding. Instead, they have held that it is
not a violation of an individual's right against self-incrimination to
deny him the right to counsel prior to deciding whether to submit to
chemical testing.57 These courts have applied the reasoning of the
United States Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California.58 In Schmer-
sixth amendment right to counsel attaches at the time of the request to submit to
chemical testing).
54. See, e.g., Heles, 530 F. Supp. at 651 (the civil and criminal nature of the pro-
ceedings is " inextricably intertwined"); Prideaux v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 310
Minn. 405, 409-11, 247 N.W.2d 385, 388-89 (1976) (the civil label can not obscure
the quasi-criminal consequences of license revocation).
55. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 169.121, subd. 2 (1984).
56. The following statutes allow the prosecution to introduce the defendant's
refusal to submit to testing into evidence: ALA. CODE § 32-5A-194(c) (1983); ALASKA
STAT. § 28.35.032(e) (1984); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-692 (K) (Supp. 1985); CAL.
VEH. CODE § 13353 (a)(4) (West Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1202 (3)(e)
(1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-227a (f) (West Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
21, § 2749 (1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-505(c) (Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 316.1932(l)(a) (West Supp.1985); GA. CODE § 68A-902.1(c) (Supp. 1985); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, § 11-501.2(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-
11-4-3(b) (Burns Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 321B.29 (West 1985); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 8-1001 (f)(1)(c) (Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:666.A(3) (West Supp.
1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1312.8 (Snpp. 1985); MINN. STAT.
§ 169.121(2)(b) (Supp. 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 63-11-39(1) (Supp. 1985); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 61-8-404(2) (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 484.389(1) (1985); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 265:88-a (Supp. 1985); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1194(4) (McKinney
Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-139.1(f) (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-08
(Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 756 (West Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 487.805(4) (1983); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1547(e) (Purdon Supp. 1985); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-23-10.1 (1984); TEX. CIv. CODE ANN. § 6701L-5(3) (g)
(Vernon Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10(8) (Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 23, § 1205(a) (Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.61.517 (Supp. 1986);
Wvo. STAT. § 31-6-105(f) (Supp. 1985).
57. See Note, supra note 21, at 381.
58. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In Schmerber, the driver was hospitalized after an auto-
mobile accident. In addition to other signs of intoxication, the officer smelled liquor
on the driver's breath. The officer directed a physician, without the driver's consent,
to take a blood sample, the results of which were admitted as evidence against him at
trial. Id. at 758-59.
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ber, the Court held that a state may compel a defendant to submit to
chemical testing without violating his fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination.5: The Court found that the blood test results
were an incriminating product of compulsion, but stated that the evi-
dence was not the driver's testimony and it did not relate to a com-
municative act or writing.6o The Court reasoned that the privilege
against self-incrimination extends generally to communicative or tes-
timonial evidence and not to real or physical evidence such as one's
own blood.61 As a result, the Court ruled that the test did not violate
the driver's fifth amendment rights.62 The procedures must not,
however, violate the due process standards set forth in Rochin.63
In South Dakota v. Neville,6  the Court answered a question left
open in Schmerber.65 The Neville Court held that the driver's refusal
to submit to the chemical test may be admitted into evidence without
violating the individual's right against self-incrimination.66 The
Court reasoned that the fifth amendment is limited to prohibiting
the use of coercion on the individual asserting the right.67 The indi-
vidual in the chemical testing situation, however, is not compelled to
refuse the test. Instead, the individual is given a choice of submitting
to or refusing the test.6 8 In fact, the officers would rather that the
59. Id. at 765.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 764 (the Court noted exceptions to this general rule, i.e. tests, such as
the lie detector test, which seem to obtain physical evidence, but which obtain re-
sponses that are basically testimonial).
62. Id. at 765.
63. See id. at 759-60.
64. 459 U.S. 553 (1983). In Neville, the police stopped the driver for failing to
heed a stop sign. The driver staggered out of his car, smelling of alcohol. Id. at 554-
55. The driver told the officers his license was revoked for a previous DWI convic-
tion. After failing field sobriety tests he was placed under arrest and read his Miranda
rights. Id. at 555. The driver said he understood his rights and agreed to talk. The
officers asked the driver to take the blood-alcohol test, warning him that he could
lose his license if he refused. Id. The driver refused to submit to the test stating,
"I'm too drunk, I won't pass the test." Id. at 555. The driver refused repeated re-
quests. A South Dakota statute provided that the refusal to submit to testing may be
admissible [as evidence] at trial. Id. at 556. The driver sought to suppress the evi-
dence, but the Supreme Court held that its admission did not violate the driver's
right against self-incrimination. Id. at 556, 564.
65. Id. at 554.
66. Id. at 564.
67. Id. at 562.
68. Id. The Court analyzed an approach used by other courts that the refusal is a
physical act rather than a communication and, therefore, not protected by the privi-
lege. Id. at 560-6 1. The court looked at Justice Traynor's explanation of this ap-
proach in People v. Ellis, 65 Cal.2d 529, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385, 421 P.2d 393 (1966).
Justice Traynor said that evidence of a refusal is like other circumstantial evidence of
"consciousness of guilt, such as escape from custody and suppression of evidence."
Neville, 459 U.S. at 561. While the Neville Court found such analogies forceful, it
[Vol. 12
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol12/iss3/8
RIGHT 7"0 COt .VSEL
individual submit to the test. A positive chemical test is more force-
ful evidence for a DWI prosecution than evidence of a refusal to sub-
mit to the test.6 9 Finding that an individual has a choice, the Neville
Court held that there was no compulsion in the individual's ex-
presssion of refusal and, therefore, no fifth amendment violation.70
The admission of the refusal into evidence is justified because ju-
rors are aware of chemcial tests and may refuse to convict a driver if
the prosecutor fails to produce such evidence.7 1 If the prosecutor is
allowed to explain the reason for the lack of evidence, the jurors
would be less likely to acquit, because they would understand why no
scientific evidence was presented by the state.
72
The Neville Court also stated that the Miranda warnings need not
be given to an individual prior to his decision to submit to the blood-
alcohol test. 73 Courts have found that drivers become confused if
they learn via Miranda warnings that they have the right to counsel,
but then are asked to decide whether to submit to chemical testing
without being allowed to contact an attorney.7 4 The Neville Court
rejected this approach and rested its decision on the absence of coercion. Id. at 561-
62.
69. See Neville, 459 U.S. at 564.
70. Id.
71. Crump, supra note 18, at 351.
72. Id. For a list of statutes which allow the prosecution to introduce the defend-
ant's refusal to submit to chemical testing into evidence, see supra note 56. The argu-
ment against admitting the refusal in evidence is that the jury is likely to assume that
the defendant knew that he was intoxicated and that this was the true reason for his
refusal. See Crump, supra note 18, at 354. The argument posits that it is unfair to
give an individual the power to refuse and then use this refusal against him at trial.
Id. The following statutes prohibit the refusal to be admitted into evidence in a crim-
inal trial for driving while intoxicated: HAWAII REV. STAT. § 17-286-159 (1976) (ad-
missible only in preliminary hearing); MD. CTS. &JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-309(a)
(1984); MASs. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 24(l)(e) (West Supp. 1986); R.I. GEN. LAws § 31-
27-2(c)(1) (Supp. 1985) (refusal not admissible unless defendant offers it); VA. CODE
§ 18.2-268(i) (Supp. 1985) (except in rebuttal).
73. See Neville, 459 U.S. at 564 n. 15. The Miranda warnings include informing the
accused of his right to remain silent, "that any statement he does make may be used
as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Earlier, in Heles, the United States
District Court for the district of South Dakota held that the Miranda warnings were
required prior to the driver's decision. Heles, 530 F. Supp. at 651. The Heles court
stated that only after arrest could one be asked to submit to the chemical test. Id.
Once arrested, the court reasoned, the driver is no longer free to leave and is in
custody. Id. The court held, therefore, that the M'iranda warnings were required at
the point when the individual was in custody or significantly deprived of his freedom
of action. Id.
74. Because of this confusion, courts which do not recognize a constitutional
right to consult an attorney before submitting to the test, have reversed driver's li-
cense revocations when the warnings were given and the officer made no clarification
to the driver of his rights. See, e.g., Rees v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 8 Cal App. 3d
746, 751, 87 Cal. Rptr. 456, 458 (1970)(driver's refusal was based on a mistaken
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resolved this problem by stating that when an individual is arrested
for DWI, police inquiry regarding whether the individual will submit
to chemical testing is not an interrogation as that term is used in
Miranda.7 5 Therefore, the warnings are not required.
3. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The sixth amendment right to counsel is much broader in scope
than that of the fifth amendment. 76 The sixth amendment provides
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to . . .have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."77 The im-
portance of the assistance of counsel at the trial has long been recog-
nized by our system ofjustice.78 The trial, however, is not the only
setting in which the Court has recognized the need and importance
of counsel. In 1961, the United States Supreme Court extended the
sixth amendment right to counsel to pretrial confrontations which
were considered critical stages of criminal proceedings. 79 In deter-
belief due to Miranda warnings); Calvert v. State Dep't of Revenue, Motor Vehicle
Div., 184 Colo. 214, 218, 519 P.2d 341, 343 (1974)(following Miranda warnings,
driver was not told he had no right to an attorney before the test); State v. Severino,
56 Hawaii 378, 380, 537 P.2d 1187, 1188 (1975)(driver was never told the Miranda
rights did not apply to the implied consent proceeding); Swan v. Department of Pub.
Safety, 311 So.2d 498, 500 (La. Ct. App. 1975)(following Miranda warnings, officers
should have stated the right to counsel was inapplicable to the blood-alcohol test);
State Dep't of Highways v. Beckey, 291 Minn. 483, 487, 192 N.W.2d 441, 445
(1971)(driver's refusal was justified because he was confused following Miranda warn-
ings); Wiseman v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 724, 729-30, 211 N.W.2d 906, 910 (1973)(re-
quest for an attorney did not constitute a refusal due to confusion resulting from
Miranda warnings).
75. Neville, 459 U.S. at 564 n.15. The Court found that police inquiry in this
situation was regulated by state law and fairly uniform. Id.
76. See People v. Bladel, 421 Mich. 39, 365 N.W.2d 56, 63 (1984).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6.
78. The Court in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), stated that counsel is
necessary to protect the rights of the nonprofessional who is assumed to be unfamil-
iar with legal proceedings. Id. at 69. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
the Court held that an indigent could not be assured a fair trial unless an attorney
was provided for him. Id. at 344. Nine years later, the Supreme Court expanded the
sixth amendment right to counsel in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
The Court in Argersinger held that without a knowing and intelligent waiver, no per-
son could be imprisoned for an offense, including a misdemeanor, unless he was
represented by counsel at trial. Id. at 37. See Comment, Criminal Law - Counsel for
Accused - Due Process Requires Accused Be Provided Reasonable Opportunity To Secure Second
DIl7I Test, 59 N.D.L. REV. 479, 483-84 (1983).
79. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961) (arraignment was considered to
be a critical stage because available defenses would be irretrievably lost if not as-
serted at that time). For other procedures considered to be critical stages, see gen-
erally, Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977) (identification of the defendant at a
preliminary hearing); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (preliminary hearing);
Mempha v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (sentencing); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967) (confrontation); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (post-indictment
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mining what constitutes a critical stage, the Court analyzed two fac-
tors.8 o First, the Court must determine whether counsel is necessary
to ensure the defendant's right to a fair trial as affected by his right
to have a meaningful cross-examination of the witnesses against him,
and to have the effective assistance of an attorney at the trial itself.81
Second, the court must determine whether substantial prejudice to
the defendant's rights could occur from the confrontation and
whether counsel could help avoid such prejudice.82
The United States Supreme Court applied the critical stage analy-
sis in Kirby v. Illinois.83 The Kirby Court held in a plurality decision
that the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after
adversary judicial proceedings have begun.84 At this stage, the
Court found the defendant is "faced with the prosecutorial forces of
organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and
procedural criminal law."85 The Court stated that adversary judicial
proceedings may begin with a formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information, or arraignment.86 This statement, how-
ever, in Kirby's plurality opinion was not joined by a majority of the
Court.8 7 The concurring opinion in United States v. Gouveia88 stated
that the Kirby holding does not foreclose the possibility that the right
to counsel might, under some circumstances, attach before the for-
mal initiation of judicial proceedings.89 One year after Kirby, how-
ever, the Court defined the critical stage to be limited to events in
which the individual needed help in dealing with legal problems or
aid in meeting the adversary.'o
lineup); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (post-indictment lineup); Esco-
bedo v. Illinios, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (prior to arraignment when the investigation has
begun to focus in on a particular suspect); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964) (once adversary proceedings have begun); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59
(1963) (preliminary hearing where the defendant entered a plea without counsel).
80. Note, supra note 21, at 377-78.
81. Wade, 388 U.S. at 227.
82. Id.
83. 406 U.S. 682 (1972). In Kirby. the Court declined to extend the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel to a post-arrest, but to pre-indictment police station identifica-
tion. Id. at 690.
84. Id. at 688. The Kirby Court referred to the right to counsel in the sixth and
fourteenth amendments. Id. It appears, however, that the Court mentioned the
fourteenth amendment only as reference to the vehicle through which the sixth
amendment is made applicable to the states. See Grano, supra note 32, at 742 n.148.
85. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689.
86. Id. Id. at 689-90. Only at these stages, the Court reasoned, has the govern-
ment committed itself to prosecute and formed an adverse position against the de-
fendant. Id.
87. United States v. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. 2292, 2302 n.3 (1984).
88. 104 S. Ct. at 2300 (Stevens, J., concurring).
89. Id.
90. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 313 (1973) (the sixth amendment does
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Jurisdictions differ on whether the sixth amendment requires a
right to counsel in the implied consent situation. Courts that have
denied the individual a right to counsel have done so because the
proceedings are civil in nature, 9' because the chemical tests are
highly accurate and not likely to be manipulated, 9 2 or because they
have not found the chemical testing situation to be a critical stage.93
Most courts which have held that an individual does have a right to
counsel at this stage in the implied consent proceeding have based
their decision on statutory grounds.94 One court, however, has
found the point at which one decides whether or not to submit to
chemical testing to be a critical stage of the DWI prosecution,
thereby, triggering the sixth amendment right to counsel.95
not provide the right to counsel at post-indictment photographic display). In Moore
v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977), the Court held that the adversary judicial criminal
proceedings began when the victim's complaint was filed in court and the suspect
should have been provided with counsel at that point. Id. at 228-29.
91. See, e.g., Gottschalk, 258 Iowa at 1178-79, 140 N.W.2d at 869 (the right to
counsel under the sixth amendment is limited to criminal prosecutions and is not
applicable to the administrative proceeding of license revocation); Seders v. Powell,
298 N.C. 453, 462, 259 S.E.2d 544, 550 (1979) (proceedings to suspend or revoke a
driver's license are civil in nature, not criminal); Agnew v. Hjelle, 216 N.W.2d 291,
298 (N.D. 1974)(refusal to submit to a chemical test until reaching an attorney is an
unreasonable refusal because there is no right to counsel in a civil proceeding); Blow
v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 83 S.D. 628, 634, 164 N.W.2d 351, 354 (1969)
(the blood-test is part of a civil and administrative proceeding and the driver was not
entitled to contact an attorney). The sixth amendment right to counsel is specifically
limited to criminal proceedings. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Other courts, however,
have found that the implied consent proceeding is too closely connected to the DWI
prosecution to make this distinction. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
92. Courts have reasoned that because counsel is not needed to ensure a fair
chemical test, counsel is not needed prior to the chemical test to protect the individ-
ual's right to a fair trial. See Note, supra note 21, at 382.
93. Murphy, supra note 39, at 246-47.
94. See, e.g., Prideaux, 310 Minn. at 419-21, 247 N.W.2d at 393-94 (implied con-
sent statute and general statutory provisions regarding right and access to counsel
provided the basis for a limited right to counsel); Dain v. Spradling, 534 S.W.2d 813,
814 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)(under state statutes and the rules of the court, the driver
had the right to consult with counsel or others prior to deciding whether to submit to
the breathalyzer test); Seders v. Powell, 298 N.C. 453, 458-59, 259 S.E.2d 544, 548
(1979)(the implied consent statute allowed the accused thirty minutes to call an attor-
ney); McNulty v. Curry, 42 Ohio St.2d 341, 346-47, 328 N.E.2d 798, 802-03
(1975)(once in custody the individual has a statutory right to contact an attorney):
Snavely v. Dollison, 61 Ohio App. 2d 140, 142-43, 400 N.E.2d 415, 416-17
(1979)(the individual's request for an attorney did not constitute a refusal because he
had a statutory right to counsel prior to taking the breathalvzer test); Comment, supra
note 78, at 484-85.
95. State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d 436, 445, 610 P.2d 893, 899 (1980), va-
cated and remanded, 449 U.S. 977, qJ/d, 94 Wash. 2d 858, 620 P.2d 999 (1980).
[Vol. 12
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B. Statutory Right to Counsel
In addition to the constitutional rights to counsel, some states
have enacted statutes which specifically give individuals a right to
counsel.96 Minnesota has enacted such a statute.9 7 Minnesota Stat-
utes section 481.10 has been fundamental to Minnesota public policy
for ninety-nine years. 98 This statute provides that an individual,
once in custody and restrained of his liberty, shall be given the right
to contact an attorney before any further proceedings, as long as
there is no imminent danger of escape. 9 9 In addition, Minnesota's
implied consent statute specifically provides that the officer inform
the individual that he has the right to counsel after submitting to
chemical testing.' o
III. MINNESOTA'S IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTE
A. History of Minnesota's Implied Consent Statute
Minnesota, following other states, enacted its first implied consent
statute in 1961.10' The statute was designed to make evidence gath-
ering easier.10 2 Under that statute, a person who drove or operated
a motor vehicle was deemed to have consented to a chemical test to
determine blood-alcohol concentration unless he expressly re-
fused.10 If he refused, his license was revoked for six months.
0 4
Ten years after the enactment of the implied consent statute, the
Minnesota Supreme Court, in State v. Palmer, 105 addressed the issue
of whether an individual has the right to counsel before deciding
whether to submit to blood-alcohol testing. 1o6 The Palmer court held
that the implied consent proceeding is a civil proceeding and, there-
96. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 544.170 (Vernon 1953)(all persons arrested and
confined by an officer, without a warrant, for a criminal offense shall be allowed at
"all reasonable hours during the day" to talk with counsel).
97. MINN. STAT. § 481.10 (Supp. 1985).
98. See Prideaux, 310 Minn. at 415, 247 N.W.2d at 391.
99. See supra note 7.
100. MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subd. 2 (b)(4).
101. Act of April 20, 1961, ch. 454, §§ 1-8, 1961 Minn. Laws 713-17 (originally
codified at MINN. STAT. § 169.123 (1961)) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 169.123).
102. Note, The.linesota S'rp/e Coirt: 1979, 64 MINN. L. RE\'. 1181, 1206 (1980).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 291 Minn. 302, 191 N.W.2d 188 (1971). In this case, the defendant was
taken into custody for driving while under the influence of alcohol. He refused to
take the test, stating he wanted to talk to his lawyer. After his initial refusal, he was
allowed to call his attorney who advised him to take the test. He told the officer he
would take the test, but his request was denied. The court held that his initial refusal
was final and could not be conditional upon his talking to an attorney first. Id. at 308-
09, 191 N.W.2d at 191-92.
106. Id. at 303, 191 N.W.2d at 189.
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fore, the driver had no constitutional right to counsel.107
In Prideaux v. State Department of Public Safety, 108 the Minnesota
Supreme Court was faced with the same issue presented in Palmer.
The court mentioned in dicta that the driver's decision regarding
chemical testing could be viewed as a critical stage in the criminal
prosecution for driving while intoxicated, which would trigger the
sixth amendment right to counsel.' 0 9 The court, however, declined
to rest its decision on constitutional grounds.I10 Instead, it held that
under Minnesota Statutes section 481.10 a driver had a right to
counsel prior to deciding whether or not to take the chemical test. I I I
Although Palmer did not base its decision on section 481.10, the Pri-
deaux court held that to the extent its decision was inconsistent with
the Palmer decision, Palmer was no longer of any force or effect. 
1 12
B. Amendments to Minnesota's Implied Consent Statute
In 1978, the Minnesota Legislature expanded the implied consent
advisory' 13 to include a limited right to counsel as provided in Pri-
deaux. ' "4 The right was limited to the extent that, if it unreasonably
delayed administration of the test, the individual was deemed to have
refused.' 15 In 1983, the legislature added a warning to the advisory.
107. Id. at 307, 191 N.W.2d at 191.
108. 310 Minn. 405, 247 N.W.2d 385 (1976). Prideaux, like Palmer, requested to
speak with his attorney before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing. Pri-
deaux, 310 Minn. at 406, 247 N.W.2d at 387. His request was also denied and his
license was revoked for six months. Id. at 406-07, 247 N.W.2d at 387.
109. Id. at 411, 247 N.W.2d at 389.
110. Id. at 414, 247 N.W.2d at 391.
111. Id. at 419, 247 N.W.2d at 393. rhe Prideaux court held that the importance of
a driver's license and the binding decision made by a driver in the chemical testing
situation made this situation a "proceeding" tinder section 481.10. Id. The court
found that although the statute did not refer to telephone calls and was written
before cars were commonly used, it must be "interpreted in accordance with the
fundamental nature of the right it affords and the technological advance of our soci-
ety." Id. The court held, therefore, that a person had the right to talk with an attor-
ney of his choice prior to deciding whether to submit to chemical testing as long as it
did not unreasonbly delay the procedure. Id. at 421, 247 N.W.2d at 394. This right,
the court held, would be satisfied if the person is given a reasonable amount of time
to contact and talk with his attorney. Id.
112. Id. at 422, 247 N.W.2d at 395. The court, however, did not formally overrule
Palmer, since Palmer did not directly address the right to counsel under § 481.10. Id.
113. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 727, § 3, 1978 Minn. Laws, 788, 792-93 codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subd. 2(b)(l)-(4) (1978)) (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subd. 2(b)(1)-(5) (1984)). The advisory is the portion of the
statute which contains the information an officer must tell the individual at the time
the chemical test is requested. See .\)Jto, 369 N.W.2d at 520 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
114. See Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 515.
115. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 727, § 3, 1978 Minn. Laws 788, 792-93 codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subd. 2(b)(3) (1978)) (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 169.123, subd. 2(b)(4) (1984)); see. e.g., Martin v. Commissioner of Pub.
[Vol. 12
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The warning stated that if a driver refused to take the test, the refusal
would be admissible in evidence against him at trial.' 16
In 1984, the most recent change occurred. The legislature re-
worded the advisory to inform the individual that "Minnesota law
requires the person to take a test to determine if the person is under
the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance."' 17 In addition,
the legislature removed that portion of the advisory which provided
that the driver had a limited right to an attorney prior to testing.' I8
Instead, the officer now informs the driver that "after submitting to
testing, the person has the right to consult with an attorney and to
have additional tests made by a person of his own choosing."' 19 The
Safety, 358 N.W.2d 734, 736 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (a limited statutory right to coun-
sel was not denied by an officer's refusing to delay testing until the individual's attor-
ney arrived as long as the driver was allowed to talk with the attorney on the
telephone).
116. MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subd. 2(b)(5). In Alaska and Nebraska refusal to sub-
mit to chemical testing is a criminal offense. ALAsKA STAT. § 28.35.032() (Supp.
1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-669.08(3) (1985).
117. Act of May 2, 1984, ch. 622, § 10, 1984 Minn. Laws 1541, 1546-47 (codified
at MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subd. 2(b)(1)(1984)) (emphasis added).
118. In 1982, the advisory read:
(1) that if testing is refused, the person's right to drive will be revoked for
a period of six months; and
(2) that if a test is taken and the results indicate that the person is under
the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, the person will be subject
to criminal penalties and the person's right to drive may be revoked for a
period of 90 days; and
(3) that the person has a right to consult with an attorney but that this
right is limited to the extent that it cannot unreasonably delay administra-
tion of the test or the person will be deemed to have refused the test; and
(4) that after submitting to testing, the person has the right to have addi-
tional tests made by a person of his own choosing.
MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subd. 2(b)(l)-(4) (1982), The current version of the advisor%'
reads:
(1) that Minnesota law requires the person to take a test to determine if the
person is under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance;
(2) that if testing is refused, the person's right to drive will be revoked for
a minimum period of one year or, if the person is under the age of 18 years,
for a period of one year or until he or she reaches the age of 18 years, which-
ever is greater;
(3) that if a test is taken and the results indicate that the person is under
the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance, the person will be subject
to criminal penalties and the person's right to drive may be revoked for a
minimum period of 90 days or, if the person is under the age of 18 years, for
a period of six months or until he or she reaches the age of 18 years, which-
ever is greater;
(4) that after submitting to testing, the person has the right to consult with
an attorney and to have additional tests made by a person of his own choos-
ing; and
(5) that if he refuses to take a test, the refusal will be offered into evidence
against him at trial.
MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subd. 2(b)(l)-(5) (1984).
119. MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subd. 2 (b)(4).
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legislature also extended the revocation period for refusal from six
months to one year.'
20
IV. THE NiFi.oT DECISION
A. Factual Background
In Nyflot, the driver was arrested for driving while intoxicated on
September 23, 1984 and was taken to a nearby law enforcement
center.12' The deputies read her the advisory found in Minnesota's
implied consent statute.' 2 2 The driver insisted that she be allowed
to contact her attorney before deciding whether to submit to chemi-
cal testing.t123 The deputies told her that the law had been changed
and she no longer had that right. At first, the driver agreed to take
the test, but when the Breathalyzer machine was ready, she declined.
One of the deputies told her that her action constituted a refusal.124
At this point, she was allowed to call her attorney. After consulting
with her attorney, the driver again stated that she would take the test.
The machine had already been disassembled, however, and one of
deputies told her that she had already refused and could not change
her mind. t25
As a result of the refusal, her driver's license was revoked.t26 The
trial court sustained the license revocation and the driver ap-
pealed.127 On appeal, the driver argued that the 1984 amendments
to the implied consent statute did not effectively limit the applicabil-
ity of Minnesota Statutes section 481.10 or change Prideaux. She also
argued that if the amendments actually changed her rights, they vio-
lated the sixth amendment, the due process clause, and the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution.1 2 8 The Minne-
sota Court of Appeals held that although it seemed that the legisla-
ture intended to take away an individual's limited right to counsel
prior to testing, the amendments to the implied consent advisory
120. Id., subd. 2(b)(2).
121. A)flot, 369 N.W.2d at 513.
122. Id. at 513-14; see also MINN. STAT. § 169.123.
123. Aflot, 369 N.W.2d at 514.




127. Id. The trial court rejected the driver's arguments that (1) under Minnesota
Statutes section 481.10, as it was interpreted in Prideaux. she had a limited right to
consult her attorney prior to deciding whether to take the test and that the 1984
amendment to the implied consent advisory did not change that right, and (2) the
sixth amendment right to counsel as provided in the United States Constitution ap-
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were not an effective way to achieve that end.129 In addition, the
court stated that if the legislature had intended "a blanket denial" of
the right to counsel prior to testing, this denial may violate an indi-
vidual's sixth amendment right to counsel.] 30 The commissioner ap-
pealed this holding to the Minnesota Supreme Court.' 3'
B. Holding and Analysis
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that an individual arrested for
driving while under the influence of alcohol has neither a statutory
nor a constitutional right to counsel before deciding whether to sub-
mit to chemical testing.]32 In so deciding, the court recalled a state-
ment it made in Prideaux. 133 The Prideaux court stated that if the
implied consent statute were worded in such a way as to forbid a
limited right to counsel before chemical testing, the implied consent
statute, which is later and more specific in its scope than Minnesota
Statutes section 481.10, would control.134 The legislature had
demonstrated its approval of Prideaux by amending the implied con-
sent advisory to include a limited right to counsel, as set out in Pri-
deaux. 135 The Nyflot court reasoned, therefore, that the 1984
amendments, which removed the statement regarding the limited
right to counsel, must reflect the legislature's intent to eliminate the
limited right to counsel.13 6
The court in Nyflot also found that there was no sixth amendment
right to counsel before deciding whether to submit to chemical test-
ing. The court based its holding upon Kirby which held that the right
does not attach until judicial proceedings are formally commenced
by indictment, complaint, or substitute for complaint. 3 7 In addi-
tion, the court held that the fifth amendment right to counsel, based
129. Id. The court of appeals stated that the legislature changed the implied con-
sent advisory, but did not change the substantive law the implied consent advisory
was based on. Nyflot v. Commissioner ol Pub. Safety, 365 N.W.2d 266, 268 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1985). Therefore, drivers arrested for driving while intoxicated still have a
limited right to counsel under Minnesota Statutes section 481.10 before deciding
whether to submit to chemical testing. Id. The court said it "cannot supply that
which the legislature purposely omits or inadvertently overlooks." Id. (quoting Nor-
thland Country Club v. Commissioner ofIaxation, 308 Minn. 265, 271, 241 N.W.2d
806, 809 (1976)).
130. Nyflol, 365 N.W.2d at 268-69.
131. ,Vyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 513.
132. Id. Justices Scott and Kelley concurred specially and filed opinions. Id. at
517, 518. Justice Yetka dissented and filed an opinion in which Justice Wahl joined.
Id. at 519.
133. Id. at 515.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 515.
137. Id. at 516.
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on Miranda, did not apply. The court stated that Miranda only ap-
plies to interrogation, which has been defined as express question-
ing, or words or actions by officers, which are reasonably likely to
evoke an incriminating response.138 The court also quoted the fol-
lowing language from Neville: "in the context of an arrest for driving
while intoxicated, a police inquiry of whether the suspect will take a
blood-alcohol test is not an interrogation within the meaning of
Miranda. " 139
The court also rejected the driver's due process argument. The
court held that, as with the sixth amendment right to counsel, due
process does not demand that a driver, arrested for DWI, be given
the right to counsel before deciding whether to take a test required
by law. 140 The court found this to be especially true when the indi-
vidual is told that he is required to take the test. 141 The court held
that a driver does not have the right to refuse the chemical test, but
rather the legislature gave him the power to refuse with its attendant
consequences. 1
4 2
C. Concurrence and Dissent
Justice Scott concurred specially in the Nyflot opinion. He stated
that the 1984 amendments to the implied consent statute clearly
show the legislature's intent to deny an individual the right to coun-
sel before chemical testing.143 Justice Scott found that although
such a result seems unfair, the statute could not be overruled unless
it was found to be unconstitutional. He reasoned that testing for
blood-alcohol content is a search and seizure. 144 Because there is no
constitutional right to contact an attorney before a search is con-
ducted, he argued the statute is constitutional. 145
Justice Kelley also filed a concurring opinion. He too agreed with
the majority that the 1984 amendments to the implied consent stat-
ute effectively eliminated the right to counsel prior to chemical test-
ing. 146 Justice Kelley, however, did not find the majority's analysis of
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 516-17.
141. Id. at 517. The court also rejected Nvflot's equal protection argument, stat-
ing that all arrested drivers are treated equally. The court also held that there was a
rational basis for denying drivers the right to the assistance of counsel before decid-
ing whether to submit to chemical testing. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 518.
145. Id.
146. Id. Justice Kelley stated that because the 1984 amendments were later in
time and more specific in scope, they' modified the meaning of proceeding in Minne-
sota Statutes section 481.10. Id.
[Vol. 12
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [1986], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol12/iss3/8
RIGHTO CON'SEL
the amendments' constitutionality necessary. Instead, he stated that
the civil action to revoke a driver's license is totally distinct from a
criminal DWI prosecution, 147 and is, therefore, valid without resort-
ing to a constitutional analysis of the criminal aspects of the DWI
charge.
Justice Yetka filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Wahl
joined. The dissent stated that the Prideaux decision was still good
law and should be followed. 14 The 1984 amendments, the dissent
stated, did not limit the effect of Minnesota Statutes section
481.10.149 The dissent also found an infringement of the individ-
ual's right to privacy when he is forced to take a blood-alcohol test
and is simultaneously denied the right to counsel.150 Justice Yetka
balanced "the extent of intrusion upon the individual's dignitary in-
terests" against the state's interests.15' He found that the dignity of
an individual to determine his own rights by consulting with a
trusted lawyer rather than his accuser, is "gravely intruded upon"
when he is denied counsel before chemical testing.15 2 The dissent
found this intrusion outweighed the state's interest in decreasing the
number of refusals because the state did not show the intrusion was
reasonable. 153
147. Id.
148. Id. at 519. Justice Yetka noted that in Prideaux, the court found a right to
counsel under Minnesota Statutes section 481.10 despite the fact that under the im-
plied consent statute at that time, officers were not required to advise a driver of any
right to counsel. Id. at 520. Later the legislature amended the advisory to conform
to the holding in Prideaux by requiring an officer to tell a driver that he had a limited
right to counsel. Id. Justice Yetka found, however, that this amendment did not give
the driver any greater rights than he had prior to its enactment.
149. Id. at 520. Justice Yetka stated that the legislature's intent was unclear be-
cause it amended the advisory section of the implied consent statute, but not Minne-
sota Statutes section 481.10, which is the source of the right to counsel in the implied
consent situation. Id. at 523. Therefore, Justice Yetka stated, "[wihen two statutes
can be read in harmony with each other, especially when we are dealing with such a
fundamental right as right to counsel, we can and should interpret the 1984 amend-
ments as still permitting the right to counsel." Id.
150. Id. at 520.
151. Id. at 520-21.
152. Id. at 521 (making an individual go to the police station is in and of itself an
intrusion on his dignity, but holding him "incommunicado" makes the intrusion even
more severe).
153. Id. The state's interest is to decrease the number of refusals to take the test
and to increase the number of DWI convictions. Id. Justice Yetka found that the state
did not show that the right to counsel affected the individual's decision of whether or
not to submit to testing. Id. He stated that the fact that the number of refusals has
decreased since the 1984 amendments was probably because the penalty for refusal
had increased from a six month revocation to a one year license revocation. Id. Jus-
tice Yetka also pointed out that it was after the driver was permitted to call her attor-
ney that she was willing to take the test. Id. at 523. The state was also concerned that
if an attorney could be consulted in this situation, the officers would have to provide
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In addition to finding that the majority's holding would violate an
indvidual's right to privacy, the dissent found that it would also vio-
late an individual's sixth amendment right to counsel.154 Justice
Yetka stated that the implied consent proceeding is a "critical stage"
of the criminal process. ' 55 He believed that while it seems that a
majority of the justices on the United States Supreme Court support
the Kirby rationale, it remains short-sighted and arbitrary. He argued
that the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized this short-sight-
edness in other cases.' 56 Even under Kirby, Yetka announced, the
implied consent process should be considered a critical stage in the
criminal proceeding.15 7 The dissent maintained that the proceed-
ing's civil label should not be dispositive,158 because the chemical
test is the best evidence for a criminal DWI conviction and a reading
of over.10% is prima facie evidence of a criminal violation.'59 Justice
Yetka found that the ticket the officer gives the driver is the func-
tional equivalent of a complaint.160 The dissent stated, therefore,
that formal proceedings commence when the ticket is issued and,
under Kirby, the right to counsel attaches at this point.161
The dissent pointed out that most people believe that if they are in
trouble, the first thing they should do is contact an attorney.162 The
majority opinion conveys the message that "[y]es, you have the right
to counsel, but not until we have all the evidence to convict you."' 16 3
V. DISCUSSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court faced a difficult issue in Nyflot.
While confronting this issue, the court was aware of the exigent need
to rid our streets of drunken drivers. Minnesota's implied consent
statute has greatly enhanced the process of obtaining evidence which
is used in the criminal prosecution of drunk drivers. By interpreting
individuals with the opportunity to consult with an attorney in other search and
seizure situations. Id. at 522. The dissent disagreed and pointed out that the implied
consent situation was different because it requires a bodily intrusion. Id.
154. Id. at 521.
155. Id.
156. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court has extended the right to counsel to civil
proceedings. Id. Justice Yetka also noted that a state may provide its citizens greater
protection in its constitution than is provided by federal law. Id. at 523.
157. Id. at 521.
158. Id. at 522.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. Justice Yetka stated that the ticket could be given on the highway or at the
station. Id. He reasoned, therefore, that the fact that formal charging is done after
the chemical test, is a manipulation of the system and should not deprive one of the
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the implied consent statute to forbid a driver the right to consult an
attorney prior to chemical testing, the implied consent procedure
runs more smoothly for the state and difficult evidence gathering
problems are avoided. If a driver was allowed to consult with an at-
torney, he may be advised by the attorney to exercise his power not
to submit to the test, thereby possibly depriving the state of direct
and incriminating evidence. 164 Under these circumstances, there
may be fewer convictions and, therefore, a reduction in the deterrent
effect of prosecution. Furthermore, if a driver was allowed to consult
an attorney, a second problem would arise. The legal system would
have to address the question of whether to provide an attorney for
those who cannot afford one. Providing counsel for the indigent not
only would be expensive, but also may prolong the time before test-
ing, thereby reducing the evidentiary value of the test results.
The difficulty of facing such problems, however, should not stand
in the way ofjustice or the enforcement of constitutional rights. Our
system of justice should not fear that if an accused is permitted to
consult with an attorney, he will become aware of, and exercise pow-
ers and rights he has under the law.165 Under the implied consent
statute, it is an affirmative defense for the individual to prove that his
refusal to submit to the chemical test was based on reasonable
grounds. 166 In other words, an individual may refuse to consent to
chemical testing if such refusal is based on reasonable grounds.
Whether the grounds for refusal are reasonable or not, however, the
implied consent statute clearly provides an individual with the power
to refuse chemical testing.' 6 7 The issue thus becomes whether such
testing is a critical stage in the state's potential criminal prosecution
of the driver.
164. However, as Justice Yetka pointed out in his dissent, once consulted, the at-
torney in NVyflot advised her to take the test. Id. at 523.
165. See Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490. In Escobedo, the Court stated:
We have . . . learned the . . . lesson of history that no system of criminal
justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend for its continued effec-
tiveness on the citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitu-
tional rights. No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an
accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and
exercise, these rights. If the exericse of constitutional rights will thwart the
effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is something very
wrong with that system.
Id.
The Court in Wade stated that to refuse to recognize the right to counsel for fear
that counsel will obstruct the course of justice is contrary to the basic assumptions
upon which this Court has operated in Sixth Amendment cases." Wade, 388 U.S. at
237-38.
166. MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subd. 6 (3) (1984).
167. See Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 517; MINN. STAT. § 169.123, subd. 4.
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A. The Chemical Testing Situation is a Critical Stage
The driver has a sixth amendment right to counsel prior to decid-
ing whether to submit to the chemical test. The Prideaux court held
that it is only after the driver decides whether to submit to chemical
testing that the proceeding divides into its civil and criminal as-
pects.' 6 8 While the implied consent proceeding has been labeled
civil in nature, it is too closely tied to the criminal DWI prosecution
to make a clear distinction.169 Therefore, the right to counsel as
provided under the fifth and sixth amendments must be considered.
The following facts reflect the nexus between the implied consent
proceeding and the DWI prosecution and illustrate the critical na-
ture of the decision of whether to submit to chemical testing. If in
the implied consent situation, the individual refuses to take the test,
the refusal will be offered into evidence against him at the DWI pros-
ecution trial.170 If the individual takes the chemical test, the test re-
sult could be used against him in the DWI prosecution.'Tl
Furthermore, the chemical test shows that a person has an alcohol
concentration of over .10%, this is not merely evidence, rather it is
proof that the person is guilty of a misdemeanor.17 2 These factors
demonstrate the possiblity of substantial prejudice to the driver's
rights should he make an uninformed decision. An attorney would
help avoid this prejudice.
An attorney is an objective third party who would inform the indi-
vidual of what constitutes a reasonable refusal. Without an attorney,
the driver will not know when his refusal is unreasonable. An attor-
ney could also clarify the police officer's statements and make sure
that the driver is properly informed and understands the ramifica-
tions of his decision.m73 Even the court in Nyflot recognized that the
168. It becomes a civil proceeding if the individual refuses testing, but a criminal
proceeding if the individual consents to testing. Prideaux, 310 Minn. at 410, 247
N.W.2d at 389.
169. "The fact that implied consent is labeled a 'civil' proceeding is not disposi-
tive." Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 522 (Yetka, J., dissenting). Even if the proceeding is
considered to be civil and seperate and distinct from the criminal DWI prosecution,
the Minnesota Supreme Court has found a right to counsel in certain civil actions. Id.
at 521. BothJustice Yetka in his dissent and the court of appeals cited two civil cases
in which the right to counsel was found: Cox v. Slama, 355 N.W.2d 401, 403 (Minn.
1984)(right to counsel in civil contempt hearings where incarceration is a real possi-
bility) and Hepfel v. Bashaw, 279 N.W.2d 342, 348 (Minn. 1979)(right to counsel in
paternity adjudications). Id. at 521; ,V'flot, 365 N.W.2d at 270.
170. MINN. STAT. § 169.121, subd. 2.
171. Id. As pointed out in Nyflot, " . . . chemical testing is the best evidence for a
criminal DWI conviction." Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 522 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
172. See Ntflot, 369 N.W.2d at 522 (Yetka,J., dissenting). It is a misdemeanor for a
person to operate a motor vehicle when the person's alcohol concentration is .10%
or more. MINN. STAT. § 169.121, subd. 1(d).
173. As the court of appeals pointed out "It is . . .confusing to tell a person on
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advice of counsel could be useful: "[a]n attorney may advise the
driver of the consequences of refusal and of the consequences of tak-
ing the test and failing it. He also may advise the driver to take the
test."' 174 Some drivers are more likely to believe the advisory if it
comes from their attorney.17 5 It has been argued that the chemical
testing process is scientific and routine, and consequently, there is
no need for an attorney's supervision. As has been shown, however,
an attorney is more than a supervisor, he is an objective third party
who is available to inform, provide security, and clarify so that the
individual makes a sound decision.
The driver's decision is not easy. In some circumstances, a driver
may rather face a twelve month license revocation, than take a chemi-
cal test which would increase his chance of being convicted for driv-
ing while intoxicated. 176 The penalty in either situation is grave.
The driver's decision may affect him in subsequent proceedings.'77
A driver, prior to deciding whether to submit to chemical testing, is
in custody, often at the police station, being asked by an officer of the
law to submit to a test which may give proof of his violation of the law.
If the driver refuses, his refusal will be used against him at the DWI
prosecution. As the court of appeals noted, this driver is faced with
"the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the
intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law."178 The indi-
vidual faced with the decision of whether to submit to chemical test-
ing needs "aid in coping with legal problems" and "assistance in
meeting his adversary."179 In addition, as Justice Yetka argued in his
dissent to the Nyflot opinion, the ticket issued to a driver arrested for
driving while intoxicated serves as a summons to appear in court and
is "the functional equivalent of a complaint."180 The police could
one hand testing is required, but on the other hand the driver does not have to sub-
mit to testing." Nyflot, 365 N.W.2d at 268.
174. Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 517 n.3.
175. Id. at 517 n.3.
176. See Prideaux. 310 Minn. at 412, 247 N.W.2d at 390.
177. Id. The United States Supreme Court in Wade stated that "in addition to
counsel's presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone
against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out,
where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial."
1'ade, 388 U.S. at 226.
178. See V\)flot, 365 N.W.2d at 270 (quoting Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689). The concur-
ring opinion in United States v. Gouveia stated that the Kirby holding does not foreclose
the possibility that the right to counsel might, under certain circumstances, attach
before the formal initiation ofjudicial proceedings. Gouveia, 104 S. Ct. at 2300 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring).
179. See Ash, 413 U.S. at 313.
180. N)flot, 369 N.W.2d at 522 (Yetka, J., dissenting); see also Nyflot, 365 N.W.2d at
270 (the officer usually gives the driver a charging document in the form of a uniform
traffic ticket or tab charge).
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issue the ticket prior to chemical testing, therefore, as Justice Yetka
pointed out, the fact that the ticket is issued after the test is just a
manipulation of the system.' 8 ' Prior to chemical testing, it appears
that "the adverse positions of government and defendant have solid-
ified."182 Consequently, adversarial proceedings have begun,18 3 and
the point at which one must decide whether to submit to chemical
testing is a critical stage. This set of circumstances strongly indicates
that the sixth amendment right to counsel should attach.
B. The Driver's Fourteenth Amendment Right to Counsel
The right to counsel before deciding whether to submit to chemi-
cal testing is necessary for a fair trial. As a result, there is not only a
sixth amendment right to counsel at this stage, but also a fourteenth
amendment right to counsel.184 The due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment requires reasonableness and fundamental fair-
ness.' 8 5 It is not reasonable to hold a person, arrested for the crime
of DWI, incommunicado while waiting for him to make a serious and
binding decision. The driver is being forced to make a decision that
will effect later proceedings, 186 could result in a one-year license rev-
ocation, and which may effect his "pursuit of a livelihood."197 With-
out the aid of counsel, such actions unreasonably violate the basic
notion of an arrested person's liberty in communicating beyond con-
finement,188 and deprive the driver of the fundamental fairness em-
bodied in the fourteenth amendment.189 Providing a driver with a
reasonable opportunity to contact counsel at this stage of the pro-
ceeding satisfies the due process demands of the fourteenth amend-
ment; it would also resolve the problems of confusion resulting from
Miranda warnings when the warnings are given prior to chemical
testing. 190
The fifth amendment right to counsel, as provided through the Mi-
randa warnings, has been held to be inapplicable to the chemical test-
ing situation because the blood sample is physical, not testimonial
evidence, 19 1 and the refusal is not coerced.192 The Miranda warnings
should be given, however, because this situation is, in effect, a custo-
181. Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 522 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
182. See Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689.
183. See N)flot, 369 N.W.2d at 522 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
184. See Sites, 300 Md. at 716-18, 481 A.2d at 199-200.
185. See Murphy, supra note 39, at 219-20.
186. See Prideaux, 310 Minn. at 412, 247 N.W.2d at 390.
187. Heles, 530 F. Supp. at 652; Sites, 300 Md. at 717, 481 A.2d at 199-200.
188. Newton, 291 Or. at 807-09, 636 P.2d at 406-07.
189. Heles, 530 F. Supp. at 652; Sites, 300 Md. at 717-18, 481 A.2d at 199-200.
190. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
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dial interrogation and may result in incriminating statements by the
accused. The Miranda court defined custodial interrogation as
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of ac-
tion in any significant way."'
9 3
The Miranda criterion applies in an implied consent situation. The
chemical testing situation is more than just a routine traffic stop.
The driver is often brought to the police station where he is asked to
make a binding and far-reaching decision. The officer asks him
whether he will submit to the chemical test, which may lead to an
incriminating response.19 4 The police officers have initiated ques-
tioning and the accused is in custody. This situation fits the defini-
tion of "custodial interrogation." By providing that the individual
has a right to counsel prior to chemical testing, the Miranda warnings
may be given without the danger of confusing the arrested driver
regarding when his right to counsel attaches.
C. There is a Statutory Right to Counsel Prior to Chemical Testing
In addition to violating the constitutional right to counsel, the re-
sult in Nyflot violates a statutory right to counsel. Minnesota Statutes
section 481.10 states that an individual, once in custody and re-
strained of his liberty, shall be provided with the right to contact an
attorney before further proceedings, as long as no imminent danger
of escape exists.195 This law existed, unchanged, for ninety-nine
years. The implied consent statute does not directly repeal section
481.10. It does not even provide for an exception to this section.
The legislature merely changed the advisory so that the officer is no
longer required to tell the driver that he has a limited right to counsel
prior to testing. It is unlikely that the legislature intended to abolish
a right to counsel which has been unaltered for nearly a century
merely by omitting a statement in an advisory. Clearly, there are
more explicit ways for the legislature to eliminate such an important
right if that were its intent.
Although the implied consent statute is later in time and more spe-
cific in scope than Minnesota Statutes section 481.10, it is not neces-
sarily controlling. Minnesota Statutes section 645.26 requires that if
a general provision is in conflict with a special provision, the two
shall be construed, if possible to give effect to one another.96 In
addition, the implied repeal of a former statute will occur only when
193. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
194. In South Dakota v. Neville, when the respondent was asked to submit to a
blood-alcohol test, he refused and replied "i'm too drunk, I won't pass the test."
Neville, 459 U.S. at 555.
195. MINN. STAT. § 481.10.
196. MINN. STAT. § 645.26 (1984).
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the two enactments are irreconcilable. 197 It is particularly important
not to erode the strength of section 481.10 in view of a recent United
States Supreme Court decision regarding the right to counsel under
the United States Constitution. 198 Until the legislature clearly shows
its intention to remove this important and long-standing right to
counsel from the implied consent proceeding, the statutes must be
reconciled. '99 The implied consent statute does not forbid one the
right to counsel prior to deciding whether to submit to chemical test-
ing. The statute merely eliminates this right from the advisory. In
short, the implied consent advisory requires that the officer inform
the driver that he has the right to an attorney after submitting to
testing. The statute does not, however, explicitly preclude the driver
from exercising his right before the test. The two statutes are, in-
deed, reconcilable. Minnesota Statutes section 481.10 provides the
driver with the right to contact an attorney in this custodial situation
197. State v.Jonason, 292 N.W.2d 730, 734 (1980). See also MINN. STAT. § 645.39.
198. On March 10, 1986, the United States Supreme Court held that police failure
to tell a defendant that an attorney had been obtained for him and that the attorney
had called, did not deprive him of the information necessary to knowingly waive his
fifth amendment right to counsel. Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1141 (1986).
In Moran, the defendant was arrested in Rhode Island for burglary. While under
arrest, the police obtained evidence suggesting that he may have been involved in a
murder. Id. at 1138. Unknown to the defendant, his sister obtained counsel for him.
An assistant public defender called the police station and said that she would act as
the defendant's counsel if he was going to be questioned. She was assured that the
defendant would not be questioned that night. Id. at 1139. Less than one hour after
the call, the police gave the defendant the Miraida warnings and began questioning
the defendant. They obtained waivers from him regarding his right against self-in-
crimination and his right to counsel, and obtained statements admitting to the mur-
der. Id. The defendant did not ask for an attorney, however, he was never told his
sister retained one for him or that the attorney called and asked to be present for
questioning. Id.
In Minnesota, the attorney would have been admitted to see the defendant. See
MINN. STAT. § 481.10. Under Minnesota Statutes section 481.10 an officer, who has a
person in custody, "shall admit any resident attorney retained by or in behalf of the
person restrained, or whom he may desire to consult, to a private interview at the
place of custody." Id. (emphasis added). Minnesota now provides greater protec-
tion for those in custody than that provided under the United States Constitution. If
the implied consent statute is construed to limit the applicability of Minnesota Stat-
utes section 481.10, the erosion of the statute will begin. If this erosion continues, it
could threaten the right, now only available through the statute, of an attorney to see
his client.
199. In N)flot, Justice Yetka espoused, "[wlhen two statutes can be read in har-
mony with each other, especially when we are dealing with such a fundamental right
as right to counsel, we can and should interpret the 1984 amendments as still permit-
ting the right to counsel." Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 523 (Yetka,J., dissenting). A statute
should be analyzed as it reads and effect should be given to the clear meaning of its
language. See State ex. rel. Livingston v. Minneapolis Fire Dep't Relief Ass'n, 205
Minn. 204, 206, 285 N.W. 479, 480 (1939); see also MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (1984).
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prior to testing as long as it does not unreasonably delay the testing
procedures.
As the Prideaux court held, however, the right to counsel in the
implied consent situation must be limited because as the driver tries
to contact his attorney, the blood-alcohol content in his system will
dissipate. 2 0 Minnesota requires that the chemical test be performed
within two hours from the time the person was driving.201 Thus, in
accordance with section 481.10, during this period, or a more limited
period, the driver should be allowed to contact an attorney.
D. Possible Alternatives to Resolve the Drunken Driving Problem
While drunken drivers are a threat to everyone and legislation is
needed to address this national problem, the answer is not to deprive
individuals of their basic right to counsel. The legislature should at-
tempt to deter people from drinking and driving by increasing the
severity of the penalites for the offense.202 Penalties should be espe-
cially stiff for repeat offenders and those who illegally drive during
the revocation period. In addition, programs should be developed
to make the public aware of the legal consequences of drinking and
driving. This information alone will have a deterrent effect. While
protecting citizens from drunken drivers, community agencies
should provide help for individuals with a drinking problem. By con-
tinuing to inform the public of programs for the problem drinker,
perhaps we can reach the drinker before he reaches the road.
CONCLUSION
By holding that an individual does not have the right to counsel
before deciding whether to submit to chemical testing, the court in
Nyflot violates an individual's constitutional and statutory rights to
counsel. The issue presented in Nyflot is a difficult one. Citizens
have the right to be on the road without fear of meeting a drunken
200. See PrideaiLy, 310 Minn. at 421, 247 N.W.2d at 394.
201. See MINN. STAT. § 169.121, subd. l(e).
202. For example, in Alabama, upon the first conviction for driving while intoxi-
cated a person is punished by imprisonment for not more than one year or by fine of
not less than $250.00 nor more than $1,000.00 or both. Alt\. CODE § 32-5A-191
(Supp. 1985). Il addition, the driver's license is suspended for ninety days. Id. The
driver must also complete a DWI court referral program. Id. In Minnesota, the pen-
alty for the first offense of driving while intoxicated is license revocation for not less
than thirty days. MINN. STAT. § 169.121, subd. 4(a). Minnesota's penalty is substan-
tially less severe than the twelve month license revocation for refusing to submitto
the chemical test.
One effective penalty would be to increase the punishment according to tile per-
centage of alcohol in the person's system. In this way, those who have a high blood-
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driver. Citizens also, however, have a constitutional and statutory
right to consult an attorney and be informed by a third party whom
they trust, before making the binding decision of whether to submit
to chemical testing. By providing more effective deterrent regula-
tions, educating the public of the legal consequences of driving while
intoxicated, and reducing the number of problem drinkers, drunk
drivers will present less of a hazard on the road. At the same time,
the courts and legislature will not be creating a new hazard of depriv-
ing citizens of their basic right to counsel.
Susan M. Mindrum
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